Thanks for this. During Kennan's ambassadorship, my family lived in Yugoslavia, where my dad was posted as a Foreign Service officer. I remember my dad being irritated at Kennan's sometimes "undiplomatic" pronouncements.
Excepted From Yale History Professor, Timothy Snyder's Substack: "Thinking About," July 21, 2022; discussing the 3 "N's," with the last being the Nato Expansion hypothesis/assertion.
"Nazis," "nukes," and "NATO" have been Putin's three "N"s from the beginning of the war. His three propaganda slogans have their origins in Soviet or Russian trauma. They emerge as excuses for the war not because they have anything to do with Putin's motives or Russia's interests, but because they summon Russian fears that can be usefully directed outward, against the rest of the world. Even if Russians do not understand why they are fighting, or even what these three slogans have to do with the war, their simple evocation makes it clear that they are to keep their heads down.
Russian propaganda reaches us for much the same reasons it reachers Russians. The three “N”s give us no analytical purchase on what is actually going on; we cling to them for the reasons that Russians do, which is that they touch deeper emotions. If your default inclination is guilt about the world, and you are inclined to believe that America is responsible for all evil, then your “N” is NATO. If you are fearful and looking for a reason to do nothing, then you are best served by "nukes." And if you like to look down on others as barbarians, or have the urge to be seen as the most radical person in your pack, you will be susceptible to Putin's characterization of his chosen enemies as "Nazis."
It is easy to demonstrate that none of this makes any sense, nor has any bearing on Russia's war aims. But unless we are able to say about ourselves: "oh yes, I have that vulnerability" or "sure, I might fall for that sometimes" or "I can see how I could be led down that rabbit hole" such a demonstration will make no difference. And this, one hopes at least, is the fundamental difference between Russia and America at the moment. We still have the institutions and, one likes to hope, the inclination to reflect, to reconsider. Tyranny at some late stage is based on nothing more than the backwash of violent action: it must have been right because we did it at the tyrant's behest. Democracy depends upon the ability to catch ourselves halfway, before we internalize the slogans and defend them just because we defend them."
Great post and update on George Kennan. I read Kennan’s memoirs and these contrarian (to current policy) views by Kennan are congruent and significant. Once more, Sir, you are thoroughly studied on these issues.
I attended a seminar at the Harvard Russian Research Center hosted by Marshall Goldman in 1989. The breakup of the USSR was contemplated and I remember the concensus of the assembled experts was that no matter what happened, Russia and Ukraine would not be separated--due to historical and economic reasons you cited by Kennan.
Thanks for this. During Kennan's ambassadorship, my family lived in Yugoslavia, where my dad was posted as a Foreign Service officer. I remember my dad being irritated at Kennan's sometimes "undiplomatic" pronouncements.
Excepted From Yale History Professor, Timothy Snyder's Substack: "Thinking About," July 21, 2022; discussing the 3 "N's," with the last being the Nato Expansion hypothesis/assertion.
"Nazis," "nukes," and "NATO" have been Putin's three "N"s from the beginning of the war. His three propaganda slogans have their origins in Soviet or Russian trauma. They emerge as excuses for the war not because they have anything to do with Putin's motives or Russia's interests, but because they summon Russian fears that can be usefully directed outward, against the rest of the world. Even if Russians do not understand why they are fighting, or even what these three slogans have to do with the war, their simple evocation makes it clear that they are to keep their heads down.
Russian propaganda reaches us for much the same reasons it reachers Russians. The three “N”s give us no analytical purchase on what is actually going on; we cling to them for the reasons that Russians do, which is that they touch deeper emotions. If your default inclination is guilt about the world, and you are inclined to believe that America is responsible for all evil, then your “N” is NATO. If you are fearful and looking for a reason to do nothing, then you are best served by "nukes." And if you like to look down on others as barbarians, or have the urge to be seen as the most radical person in your pack, you will be susceptible to Putin's characterization of his chosen enemies as "Nazis."
It is easy to demonstrate that none of this makes any sense, nor has any bearing on Russia's war aims. But unless we are able to say about ourselves: "oh yes, I have that vulnerability" or "sure, I might fall for that sometimes" or "I can see how I could be led down that rabbit hole" such a demonstration will make no difference. And this, one hopes at least, is the fundamental difference between Russia and America at the moment. We still have the institutions and, one likes to hope, the inclination to reflect, to reconsider. Tyranny at some late stage is based on nothing more than the backwash of violent action: it must have been right because we did it at the tyrant's behest. Democracy depends upon the ability to catch ourselves halfway, before we internalize the slogans and defend them just because we defend them."
Great post and update on George Kennan. I read Kennan’s memoirs and these contrarian (to current policy) views by Kennan are congruent and significant. Once more, Sir, you are thoroughly studied on these issues.
I attended a seminar at the Harvard Russian Research Center hosted by Marshall Goldman in 1989. The breakup of the USSR was contemplated and I remember the concensus of the assembled experts was that no matter what happened, Russia and Ukraine would not be separated--due to historical and economic reasons you cited by Kennan.